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The article analyses the redefinition and distribution of powers between central governance and
local actors in English independent state-funded schooling. Earlier research on governance con-
firms the importance of the local and the school level in reshaping national-level reforms and
steering policies. The research draws on data from interviews with national-level policymakers
and an ethnographic school case study, thereby yielding contrasting views and perceptions of
governance at the national level, and the day-to-day reality at the local level. The empirical
analysis gives mixed results in that the national visions of innovative local practices seem not to
be manifest at the local level. Despite the legal and financial freedoms granted to academy
schools, the case academy is constrained by the national policy of steering by evaluation, namely
inspection and testing, and the managerial practices of the sponsor. The article concludes that
the real effect of academies is still under construction and meanwhile their space for action is
strongly restricted by the tools of evaluation. As a more theoretical conclusion the analysis sug-
gests that future analysis should concentrate more on action rather than structures and on eva-
luation as an embedded practice.
Introduction
Our research concerns the redefinition and re-distribution of powers between cen-
tral governance and local actors in publicly funded education. Permutations of ele-
ments of school autonomy, market approaches and varying local-authority positions
have resulted in different outcomes in European contexts. A decentralising policy
enhancing school autonomy has boosted competition, hierarchies and differentia-
tion among schools and classes in Austria, for instance, with a strong hybridisation
of the old and the new (Altrichter et al., 2014). In the case of Sweden, liberalised
school choice and the markets of education provision as part of the Free School
programme have led in Stockholm to segregation on the grounds not only of ability
but also of ethnicity (S€oderstr€om & Uusitalo, 2010). Decentralisation and strong
municipal autonomy have constituted one factor in buffering against transnational
flows of evaluation practices in Finland (Simola et al., 2013), whereas in England
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there are indications of disruptive effects of reforms on public service (Andrews &
Boyne, 2012). Common to all of these developments is their inherent embedded-
ness in local contexts. Indeed, the notions of schools changing reforms rather than
reforms changing schools (Tyack & Cuban, 1995), and of travelling policies adapt-
ing to embedded policies (Ozga & Jones, 2006), have been thoroughly studied in
earlier research on educational governance. As Ozga and Jones (2006, p. 6) point
out, although ‘policy choices may be narrowing, national and local assumptions and
practices remain significant’. There is also evidence that this local-level path depen-
dency (‘increasing returns’, see Pierson, 2000) cannot explain situations of strong
external intervention (Gains et al., 2005). The policy on introducing academy
schools in England could be considered a radical intervention, and we set out to
analyse how this has affected local-level actors.
On the one hand, the English education system is considered rather highly centra-
lised (Ainley, 2001) compared with its European counterparts, but on the other hand
many reforms have aimed at dismantling bureaucratic hierarchical structures. Much
of the dismantling has happened through the general administrative–doctrinal
change in what Hood and Jackson (1991) identified as new public management
(NPM), which could be crystallised as the introduction of private-sector methods in
the public sector, and the outsourcing of public-sector functions to the private sector
(e.g. Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). In general, the NPM reforms in education aim to
support autonomy in schools, dismantle the hierarchies of the classic bureaucratic
organisation and at the same time enhance the managerial capacity of head teachers
(Jarl et al., 2012, pp. 431–432). This development is evident within the ‘competition
state’ (Ball, 2013) in the emerging sector of state-funded independent schools,
academies and free schools.
English schools are considered to operate in an environment moulded by NPM
reforms, but which has been further shaped by the idea of networked governance
(Ball & Junemann, 2012). Currently there are elements of both governance types in
English education provision. In Stoker’s terms, the difference is that whereas the
NPM model is based on consumer choice, networked community governance draws
on complex processes of interaction (Stoker, 2011, p. 18). Summing up earlier litera-
ture, Pollitt (2009) suggests that the main feature of public-service networks is that
they are self-organising, although they frequently require an external stimulus. This
type of ‘post-welfare society’ (Tomlinson, 2001) relies on long-term consensual neo-
liberal networks in a pluralistic and complex setting (Olmedo, 2014). According to
this interpretation, the remaining coherence in education seems to be the use of data
in governance that recreates the system in a web of processes and actors as opposed to
unitary stories or common myths (Lawn, 2013, pp. 237–239). As Maroy and Van
Zanten (2009) suggest, relations in the English setting could be described as ‘multire-
gulation’ in which schools have ‘competitive interdependence’. The notions of NPM
and networked governance both aptly describe the current changes and challenges in
education governance, the former underpinning the reforming structures and the lat-
ter referring to the new ways of steering. Our entry point in understanding the shifts
in governance is independent state-funded education and, in particular, the relatively
new type of school, the academy, which helps us to grasp both the restructuring of
education as well as the changes in steering.
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The rapidly developing independent sector of state-funded education in England
has also caught the attention of other researchers. First of all, many are pointing out
the overlapping ideology between the two main parties on the matter. Academies
were first introduced in 2000 under the New Labour government as a remedy for per-
sistent educational underperformance in urban areas. The coalition government
embraced the programme and broadened its scope dramatically in 2010 by inviting
all English primary and secondary schools to become academies (Department for
Education, 2010). Goodman and Burton (2012) highlight the continuity of a move-
ment away from state schooling since the 1988 Education Reform Act regardless of
the party in power. Commenting on a similar trend, Exley and Ball (2011) note how
Conservative ideas such as independent state-funded education were pushed forward
during the New Labour era, although with a different nuance. Second, other
researchers refer to failing political goals, or at least to complex outcomes. Aggregat-
ing earlier research, Hatcher (2011) concludes that free schools are unlikely to reach
the two aims they set out: raising attainment and reducing inequality. In a quantita-
tive analysis of Key Stage-4 results, Gorard (2009) found no evidence that academies
produced better results than the schools they replaced and, in his later analysis,
showed how converted academies were established in areas segregated by socioeco-
nomic status and thus contributed to sustaining the inequalities (Gorard, 2014).
Concentrating on the central political argument of freedom for schools, Bamfield
(2012) points out the connotation of freedom as independent self-governance rather
than non-intervention by the state. Whereas the former could lead to ‘autonomous
schooling established on more genuinely democratic lines’, the latter threatens to cre-
ate ‘a new set of fiefdoms’ when government refrains from controlling the academy
sponsors (Bamfield, 2012). Earlier research supports the supposition in our analysis
of how the politically stable idea of independent state-funded schooling does not nec-
essarily manifest at the local level. Related to the discrepancy between policy and
practice, there is a paradoxical dual existence of a purported increase in school auton-
omy and a tight governmental grip through performance testing and targets (Exley &
Ball, 2011; Goodman & Burton, 2012). Given the parallel existence of ‘multi-regula-
tion’, NPM bureaucracy dismantling and increased intervention through state fund-
ing, we considered it important to focus our study on the governance tools of
evaluation, and to analyse the extent to which the local level still matters in moulding
the reforms.
According to Lundgren (1991) legislative, economic, ideological and evaluative
dimensions form the arsenal of steering forces in policymaking. Legislative changes,
in addition to fostering change in other steering forces, tend to alter the general
structural framework within which schools operate. In the case of independent
state-funded education, school autonomy has been buttressed through legislative and
economic rearrangements throughout the course of history. Indeed, the general
description of English education provision during the post-war period from 1944
until the 1970s was a national system run by local authorities. Within this framework
central government had a right of veto, local government decided on resource alloca-
tion, and it was mainly up to the teachers to decide upon the curriculum and teaching
methods (Briault, 1976). This set-up was questioned in the so-called Great Debate of
the 1970s. A radical and concrete change was the 1988 Education Reform Act, which
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began to take effect more dramatically during the 1990s when local–central relation-
ships were reformed in a centralist manner through the introduction of market
approaches, and as the National Curriculum challenged the teachers’ control over
taught content and methods (Evans & Penney, 1994; Clarke & Newman, 1997;
Tomlinson, 2001; Ball, 2013). The state-funded academies enjoy more freedom in
this centralised but heavily marketised environment, as they are granted exemptions
from following the curriculum and complying with agreements on teachers’ pay and
conditions, as well as having more budgetary independence. This autonomy is one of
the cornerstones of the managerial project in that it is understood to create conditions
for innovation and thus to enhance learning outcomes (e.g. Department for Educa-
tion, 2013a, b). The capacity of the academies to introduce innovations (Gunter &
McGinity, 2014) and the New Labour vision of using third-sector bodies (Kelly,
2007) have been criticised for being more ideological than well-functioning solutions
for public administration. Indeed, the change to academies could be seen as an ideo-
logical solution that fits in well with the current landscape of English education policy
even after the New Labour government. However, ideological steering is not the
focus of our research: in analysing evaluation we rather scrutinise the differences
between national-level policy vision and local-level practice.
Of the four steering forces, the legal and the financial frameworks set by the state
have different effects on the different school types. Our focus here is exclusively on
academies, and more specifically sponsored academies, a type of school that enjoys a
certain amount of freedom in these matters. We are interested in the possible effects
of evaluation on these academies. Evaluation in education covers a wide array of
activities on multiple levels ranging from student assessments and school inspections
to national-curriculum evaluation and international comparisons (Kellaghan et al.,
2003). It could be argued that the overarching feature of evaluation is the soft
power, steering with the help of comparing and collating data (Grek et al., 2009).
According to our understanding, soft power such as evaluation is something that
redefines different actors’ understandings of desirable action through setting explicit
targets. Dahler-Larsen (2012, p. 173), for instance, describes the effects as ‘constitu-
tive’, meaning how ‘tests, measurements and indicators help define the social reali-
ties of which they are a part’. We argue here that in the English context of
education, evaluation has become all the more powerful through the process of pri-
marily legal but also to some extent financial deregulation. We use the term evalua-
tion in this article only in the narrow meaning of inspection and standardised
testing, and analyse their effect on the formal promotion of school autonomy. We
thereby shed light on the policy on academies from the perspectives of both policy-
making and practice.
The research data and questions of access
The research data comprise interviews with key policymakers and officials, and eth-
nographic research over a two-year period. The data collection and the initial analysis
were conducted independently in the context of two different research projects, the
ethnographic case study from an academy (Salokangas, 2013) and the interviews with
policymakers. The aim of the ethnographic observation was to assess the implications
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of the policy in a case academy with regard to its relations with the sponsor, the local
authority and central government. Salokangas was embedded (McGinity & Salokan-
gas, 2014) for two academic years (2010/11 and 2011/12) in the case academy, spon-
sored by a multi-academy sponsor that, at the time of the data collection, managed a
chain of more than 15 academies. The ethnographic data utilised in this article
encompasses interview, observation as well as documentary data from the academy
and the sponsor. Kauko carried out 13 interviews alone or together with Jenny Ozga
during 2013. The informants included six politicians (two Labour, two Conservative,
one cross-bench and one Liberal Democrat), two national-level and one local-level
official, and four stakeholders from a trade union, a Regional Inspection Service Pro-
vider, a religious community and a national newspaper. Among the interviewees were
three former Her Majesty’s Chief Inspectors of Schools in England, two former Sec-
retaries of State for Education and two who were involved in organisations that spon-
sored academies. The interviewed officials were not currently working in government
or local administration. The interviews focused on the relations between different
actors in education politics, and on what the interviewees considered the most impor-
tant national and international reforms and processes. In order to ensure anonymity
the politicians are referred to in three groups (Labour, Conservative, other), and offi-
cials and stakeholders each as one group.
Both methods of data acquisition for the purposes of this article raise the ques-
tion of access in terms of the quality of the data, the validity of the results and eth-
ics. Salokangas was embedded in the academy, which enabled her to participate in
its day-to-day life for a prolonged period of time in order to conduct participant
observations for her PhD thesis (Salokangas, 2013). The research was conducted
under a three-year PhD studentship arrangement between the case academy and
the School of Education, University of Manchester (Salokangas, 2013). Her
involvement in the academy began in September 2010 and she was present in the
school during term time on a weekly basis until June 2012. The data presented
were gathered during the academic year 2011/12. The embedded research arrange-
ment facilitated observation from a close distance of the day-to-day life of the
academy and the decision-making of the academy leadership team and the chain-
level governance. It also gave access to the academy and its sponsorship policy that
was not available to the wider public. As such, the research arrangement provided
her with privileged access, which has eluded many field researchers (Walford,
1987), and has been reported as being specifically problematic for researchers
studying sponsored academies to obtain (Woods & Woods, 2009).
Three main sets of guidelines and procedures were followed to ensure that the
research was conducted ethically: the ethical guidelines of the British Educational
Research Association (2004) and the University of Manchester were complied with,
and a research contract was drawn up to ascertain that the three parties involved—
the researcher, the academy and the University—had a similar understanding of the
terms and conditions of the research in terms of participant anonymity and aca-
demic integrity, for example (Salokangas, 2013). Finally, in order to make sure that
a variety of voices would be heard and appropriately interpreted, the collected data
was validated by means of respondent validation (Simmons, 2009), or member
checking (Robson, 2002): the participants were asked to read their transcribed
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interviews and to comment on the research field notes as well as on drafts of the
reported findings.
In the case of interviews, the difficulties in ‘researching the powerful’ (Walford,
2011) culminate in the asymmetry of power and status between the interviewer and
the interviewee (see Ozga & Gewirtz, 1994), creating challenges at each stage: gaining
access, conducting relevant interviews and interpreting the data. However, it is
possible to ask, as Walford (2012) does, whether, apart from the question of access,
interviewing the powerful differs substantially from other types of research interview.
In some cases access was facilitated through existing networks, however most
interviewees were recruited only with the help of a letter of invitation. The aim in the
letters was to level the asymmetries, and to provoke interest and trust by referring to
the prestige of the institutions behind the research and showing an awareness of the
recipients’ earlier and current positions. Strategies aimed at ‘diffusing authority’
(Conti & O’Neil, 2007) were used during the interviews: a senior interviewer (Ozga)
was present in some of them and the rigorous preparation (Walford, 2011) included
studying the documentation created by the interviewees and their background organi-
sations.
The interviews are part of a larger research project comparing Finnish and English
education policymaking, but the focus of the parts used in this article was specifically
on the ways in which the academies’ policy had changed the relationships between
actors at the national and local levels, and how it had affected the steering capacity of
central governance.
A thematic analysis of academy steering and evaluation was conducted on these
two data sets for the purposes of this article. We carried out the analysis of the respec-
tive data individually. However, we share a common understanding of qualitative
research as building a well-grounded interpretation, starting with describing and or-
ganising the text in the research material, selecting the relevant parts and eventually
reorganising them into a holistic interpretation (Fairclough, 1992). Salokangas uti-
lised a variety of data-reduction strategies to manage the cumulating data from the
case academy, including summary sheets and memos that helped in identifying broad
themes such as autonomy, innovation, pedagogy, management and, most importantly
for this article, local–central relations. Kauko adopted similar strategies: he summar-
ised the interview text in short statements, which he organised under broader recur-
ring themes such as teacher professionalism, policy-making, data governance and the
most relevant theme for this article, local–central relations. The interpretation and
arguments used in this article derive mostly from the last theme, and also from search-
ing all citations discussing academies. When we combined the analyses we encoun-
tered similar discussions in both data sets, such as the diminishing middle-tier
governance, questions of accountability and transparency, and local autonomy. We
encapsulated these issues in our analysis of steering and evaluation.
In the following we first discuss how disappointment in local authorities at the
national level challenged their role as the main providers of education, and the ways
in which this shifted control accordingly. In general, both major parties saw acade-
mies as a plausible new solution in this context. However, in terms of governance this
challenging of local authorities seemed to create a power vacuum in the middle tier,
which the case-study data makes apparent. Chain-specific managerial practices,
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curriculum pressures and the power of Ofsted were the main steering forces in the
case academy. We report differences and contradictions in the local and national per-
spectives, and conclude by pondering on the extent to which local actors in academies
still have space for action in the current model.
Deregulated academies to counteract local-authority inefficiency
Before going more deeply into the effects of evaluative practices, in this section we
look into the reasons for the diminishing role of local authorities and how this created
a political vacuum for the academies. It could be concluded from the existing litera-
ture and the interview material that dissatisfaction among national policymakers with
local-level performance has developed gained momentum since the 1970s. The num-
ber of local authorities was reduced by a third in 1972 (Ozga, 1986), and the long per-
iod of Conservative rule since 1979 stripped them of many financial powers (Black,
2000). Finally, the Education Reform Act (1988) introduced changes in the steering
powers of the state. First, these powers were centralised through the introduction of
the National Curriculum and state-funded grant-maintained schools. Second, the
‘local management of schools’ scheme gave them increased control over their bud-
gets. Third, the Act introduced new public management thinking through school
choice and other market-driven practices. Other significant reforms of the era
included the creation of the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) in 1992,
which fortified the inspection regime, as well as the introduction of City Technology
Colleges, the ancestors of the academies (Ball, 2013; Gewirtz, 2002).
The Labour governments (1997–2010) continued along the same lines, concen-
trating power to the centre and giving more autonomy to schools, although they also
invested more financial resources in education (Exley & Ball, 2011). Despite the
increased funding, the tone of the message to local authorities was rather tough: the
‘principle of zero tolerance will also apply to local education authorities’ (Department
of Education and Employment, 1997, p. 12; Framework Act, 1998, pp. 497A–
497B). The market emphasis was visible, for instance, in the White Paper indicating
that ‘an external private or voluntary sector sponsor’ would ‘take responsibility for a
weak or failing school against a fixed-term contract’ (Department for Education and
Skills, 2001, p. 49), and the following Education Act (2002, pt. 4) made it possible to
force ‘weak’ schools and local education authorities or those under ‘special measures’
to enter into such a contract.
One of the main political architects, Adonis (2012), described the academies as a
solution to the failure of the comprehensive school, referring to the early academies
that were beyond the control of the local authority and sponsored by non-profit
organisations. However, the programme has undergone significant changes since
then, many of them under the New Labour Government. The criteria regarding
academy sponsorship have changed significantly, for example, as the government
welcomed the involvement of universities and private schools, and later also local
authorities (Balls, 2007; National Audit Office, 2010). The Coalition government
(2010–2015) expanded the programme considerably. The Academies Act 2010 gave
the Secretary of State power to transform maintained schools based on either the
school’s request or Ofsted inspection (Academies Act, 2010). Measures included
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forcing ‘underperforming’ schools to become academies, attracting Ofsted-ranked
‘outstanding’ schools to become academies with the help of incentives related to
autonomy and extending the scheme to primary and special education. As a result,
the number of academies has increased dramatically. Whereas the New Labour goal
was to have 20 City Academies up and running before 2005 (Department for Edu-
cation and Skills, 2001), at the beginning of 2012 the number was already 1,776,
and the Secretary of Education (2010–2014) in the Coalition Government, Michael
Gove, set a target to turn the 400 ‘worst-performing’ primary schools into academies
(Ball, 2013). In total the effect is remarkable. Many schools have distanced them-
selves from local-authority governance: as of August 2014, 4,009 academies were
operational, of which 1,132 were associated with a sponsor (Department for Educa-
tion, 2014).
The interview data reveal that national-level English politicians, with little party-
related variation in emphasis, share the narrative regarding the failure of local authori-
ties as providers of education. According to interviewees, the local authorities were
stripped of their powers because of their poor performance, which forced central gov-
ernment to step in.
I [Y]ou were saying about this development of the powers having shifted from the
local level to the national level. So what do you see, why has this happened?
R What happened [happened] because of poor standards. . . . If you are a politician
on the national level your mandate is national. You really cannot go back to the
electorate and say I’m terribly sorry but [a name of a constituency] was to blame,
not me. It just doesn’t work like that. . . . I think national politicians felt that if
they were ever going to be able to deliver on their pledge to raise standards they
would have to take control of it. (Politician, Labour)
Local authorities . . . they should have been the ideal bodies to be accountable to
deliver national policy. . . . But there were failures in the quality of local
authorities. . . . [T]here were such grotesque failures on the part of some local
authorities that something had to be done. (Politician, Conservative)
Another Labour politician described the sentiment inside the party before the acade-
mies programme was introduced thus: ‘I understood and shared the Prime
Minister’s commitment that, if all else failed, why not have a special kind of school:
an academy.’
From the perspective of the policymakers the academies appeared to resolve the
main problem and dispute described by many politicians concerning how to raise
achievement standards. The belief that the programme has succeeded in this at least
partly is evident in some of the comments: ‘That’s people in all parties, feeling that
the academies will provide a better route to be able to drive up standards’ (Politician,
other); ‘I’ve no doubt, Michael Gove’s and his colleagues’, and I do talk to them a
bit, belief is that this is how you raise standards’ (Politician, other).
The interviewees referred to the academy programme as one of the key policies of
the then Secretary of State. The Coalition government’s criticism of local authorities
was also understood as rather instrumental in promoting the programme:
All I’m saying [is that] they’re quite happy with this kind of combination of general aggres-
sion towards local government alongside policy change in education undermining local.
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I don’t sense that Michael Gove is actively trying to get local government out except
insofar as the academies policy continues to be promoted. (Official)
Some politicians from the Labour and Conservative parties shared the narrative of
cross-party support for the academies in that it was noted how the programme had
survived different party regimes. However, other opinions were also expressed. Some
interviewees talked of scepticism and downright opposition from the Labour left and
some of the teachers’ unions (Stakeholder; Politician, other), whereas at the local
level the division was between local and national policymaking rather than along
party-political lines (Politician, other; Stakeholder). Some interviewees also expressed
grave concern about accountability (Stakeholder; Politican, Conservative) and how
local authorities could take on the task of a democratically elected local government
(Stakeholder).
Many interviewees understood that the academies and educational entrepreneurs,
in other words the academy chains, were filling the vacuum left by the local authori-
ties. One politician working at the local level suggested that the local authorities were
losing power: ‘The really influential people are the academy chains.’ It was also noted
that local authorities were operating in a highly competitive environment as schools
deliberated on which provider would best suit their interests, especially their financial
interests (Stakeholder). It appears from these interviews that there was some political
momentum aimed at giving academies rather than local authorities the main respon-
sibility for providing education in England.
In general, the dissolution of local control has brought the academies a lot of free-
dom. The notion of increased freedom in order to create conditions that would facili-
tate educational, managerial and governance-related innovation is the cornerstone of
the sponsored academy movement (Adonis, 2012). In the following we take a closer
look at how the academies are using these new freedoms and at the types of restriction
they entail.
Inspecting and evaluating academies
Given the practical lack of restriction on academy schools among local authorities,
apart from those that are acting as sponsors, national steering mechanisms and inter-
nal academy control are playing an ever more significant role in local governance. We
focus on the way in which national policymakers understand the main opportunities
and challenges involved in steering the academies and on the implications as far as
schools are concerned.
Many policymakers argued that there needed to be some kind of middle tier. The
basic concern was how the tasks of such a tier would be taken care of. One official pre-
sented the problem in terms of scale:
England is becoming unique amongst advanced industrial countries in not having a local
or middle tier. It’s very odd to run a whole school system, particularly primary schools . . .
from a single government department. (Official)
The resolution of this new situation was open to debate. Some envisaged a develop-
ment allowing the academy chains to create their own middle layer of governance
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(Politician, Labour). An official who considered the current system unsustainable
proposed the establishment of school commissions as a solution. Another thought the
then Secretary of State had a ‘view of different kinds of intermediate bodies’, such as
academy chains. Several newspapers referred in late 2013 to internal sources and doc-
uments at the Department for Education recommending the appointment of chancel-
lors to supervise free schools and academies (The Guardian, 2013; The Telegraph,
2013). As the debate continues at the national level, at the local level the academies
were implementing their own governance solutions.
At the local level the absence of a middle tier and the emergence of multi-academy
sponsors have created a mosaic of a system. Indeed, the existing evidence indicates
that sponsors running multi-academy chains take rather different approaches to the
governance and management of the schools they run (Hill et al., 2012), some being
more directly involved in academy-level decision-making than others. These acad-
emy–sponsor relationships may be dynamic in nature and vary greatly within the
chains depending on the developmental stage of the academy (Salokangas & Chap-
man, 2014). This was apparent in the case academy in that the local management
and the sponsor embraced the independence to which academies are entitled by dis-
tancing themselves from the local authority. This is how one of its local governors,
who was also a member of the city council, reflected on the dynamics between the
academy, the sponsor and the local authority:
This particular academy—and maybe it’s true with other academies in the chain as well
—stress very much the independence of their model, rather than what I would like to
see, independence within a strong mode of co-operation with other schools and local
authorities. And this has led to the governance structure in which decisions are taken
away from the LA. And to me it’s a disappointment. This academy was the first one to
be created [in the city] and learning from this we [local authority] have tried to make all
the remaining academies much more strongly linked in to the city than this one is. And
all the other sponsors have much stronger local links, either they are companies or insti-
tutions with city links. This academy was a bit isolated in relation to the city itself.
(Local councillor)
The academy had indeed created distance from the local authority and instead of
reaching out to the local schools was looking to the chain for collaboration and net-
works. This isolation was largely driven by the principal, and as the above citation
suggests, did not necessarily reflect the views of other local stakeholders. This also
points to a wider issue in local negotiations regarding the Local Authority’s and the
academy’s attempts to respond to the shift to networked governance (Stoker, 2011;
Ball & Junemann, 2012).
The role of Ofsted in monitoring schools has become increasingly significant given
the diminishing middle tier. In general, Ofsted was reported to have great support
and trust among national policymakers. Given the lack of middle-tier democratic
accountability, its importance was sometimes referred to as vital (Politician, Conser-
vative). Reliance on Ofsted was also evident to a Labour politician, who perceived a
general trend of assigning more and more tasks to it. However, one politician (other)
expressed concern that at the local level ‘there’s a fear of inspections from Ofsted that
only look at things that have gone wrong, they don’t suggest solutions and don’t help
create solutions’. A stakeholder mentioned the problem that Ofsted did not have the
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right to investigate the head-office function in academy chains. After the research data
had been collected it was reported in the press that this would change (The Guardian,
2014a). However, at the time of writing, the Secretary of State for Education, Nicky
Morgan, opposed sponsor inspection (The Guardian, 2014b). In sum, trust in Ofsted
was not as strong at the local level as it was among national policymakers.
Indeed, the paradox regarding the lack of sponsor accountability and the ever-
increasing accountability imposed upon schools (Glatter, 2012) was also prevalent in
the academy-level data. In the following citation a teacher who had worked in two
academies run by the same sponsor reflects on the impact of increased accountability
on the teacher’s work.
So the senior management observe us according to Ofsted criteria at least three times a
year, sometimes more, I think that’s a chain-wide policy. They are very strict about these
observations, if you’re not good or outstanding they are after your life—they make you do
that. I hate observations. I don’t mind people coming in and participating and helping, but
actually sitting there and making notes is nerve-wracking, still after six years of teaching.
And you know there’s something about the architecture of these schools, windows every-
where. My old room was a mini room, in the middle of the Maths department, and it was
windows all over, there were no walls, like a fish tank. I felt I’m always being watched.
(Teacher)
The teachers provided fairly similar accounts of the strict observational practices car-
ried out by senior management at the case academy. However, although the pressure
of transparent practice was heavy on teachers, inter-organisational transparency did
not similarly affect the sponsor in that the academy staff remained fairly oblivious to
how the sponsor operated, and to which decisions were made locally at the academy
and which were made at the sponsor level. As such the academy-level actors painted
an image of a distant sponsor that was lacking in transparency as far as local stake-
holders were concerned. This is how an experienced teacher responded to a question
regarding her understanding of how the sponsor operated:
It’s funny that you ask, I, and I think I can speak on behalf of also others working in this
school, we know very little about how things are done and what is going on at the sponsor
level. It’s rather strange, and this may sound like I’m just complaining but it’s very difficult
to get answers to your questions from the headquarters, we don’t really know who does
what in that organisation, and there is a significant lack of clarity about important things
like teachers’ pay structure, and how appointments are made at the sponsor level and
important things like that. (Teacher)
The documentary data collected at the sponsor level support this claim, as the chain-
level policy documents available to members of staff did not address either the staff
pay structure or the appointment procedures. The scope of our research does not
extend to estimations or comparisons of transparency between local-authority and
sponsor governance. Moreover, these reflections stem from a single case study. How-
ever, this case brings to light issues that may arise at the local level as a result of a lack
of sponsor transparency and the ever increasing demand for teacher accountability
owing to the powerful role of Ofsted. National-level concerns about the missing
accountable middle-tier system seemed to materialise at the academy. In addition,
Ofsted’s inspection criteria constituted powerful steering tools for the day-to-day
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practice in this context, which is indicative of the prevailing power of this type of
steering on the one hand, and of the limited room for manoeuvre within such a frame-
work on the other.
Freedom from the curriculum?
In addition to Ofsted, national-level curricula and assessment also play a major role in
directing education. The academies are not obliged to follow the National Curricu-
lum, however, which one stakeholder involved in academy sponsorship saw as a great
opportunity, but also as a source of pressure to produce good results:
The potential is that it can be used for our benefit, because the academies can be run
exactly as they want to be run, as long as they get the right results. And that’s a big driver.
But that means we could develop in our own schools, our own academies, the kind of cur-
riculum that we really think is valuable for schools. (Stakeholder)
In principle academies are perceived to enjoy increased freedom, but many also rec-
ognise that there may be hidden problems in the implementation. Referring to all
schools, one stakeholder wondered how it was possible for teachers and school lead-
ers to keep producing good results in situations of change and turmoil. A politician
(other) questioned why the Secretary of State was reforming the National Curricu-
lum: ‘Why is he [Michael Gove] bothering, if all the so-called best schools don’t have
to follow it?’ The same stakeholder quoted above pondered on the same problem of
increased freedom and the difficulties in implementing it in practice:
Strictly speaking the academy model gives more freedom to teach, to organise the school
in a way which is in keeping with the foundation of the school. Now whether our schools
will actually take that freedom I don’t know. I don’t think. Maybe in two years’ time if we
had the same conversation I could be saying different things. But, so we’re at the begin-
ning, I think, of a shift of mind-set. (Stakeholder)
Indeed, it became apparent at the local level that, regardless of the increased auton-
omy, the case academy followed the national curriculum across different subject
areas. Teachers recognised the curricular autonomy associated with their academy
status, but considered it theoretical owing to examination pressures. This is how the
Curriculum Leader, whose role was to support all the academies across the chain in
their curricular development, described the theoretical autonomy:
Although academies have the flexibility to do what they want, I think because we are still
judged against performance tables with other schools, I don’t think schools do as much as
they could. . . . [I]n year seven a lot of academies tend to do their own curriculum which
tends to be based on project-based provision but on Key Stage 4 and Key Stage 5 I don’t
say they explore. This has also got to do with the nature of the chain, you know they [the
sponsor] take on board failing schools, that’s why they got to be able to perform rapid
improvements and unfortunately they are measured on results, so to some extent the acad-
emies still [have] got to play the game. (Curriculum Leader)
Not surprisingly, the curricular freedom yields to the pressures of the testing regime.
The lesson observations conducted in the academy confirmed this in that the learning
experience in English and Maths for years 10 and 11 consisted of weekly exam
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preparation. From the perspective of an official such theoretical autonomy seemed to
be a politically clever move, promoting freedom in principle while holding a grip on
the steering mechanisms:
And he [Michael Gove] may say that that squares that circle for him. That he resets the
curriculum in his own fashion. And essentially, the pressure, both informal and maybe
some way through inspection and other mechanisms, through the examination system for-
mally requires everyone to do it. (Official)
This resonates with the theoretical autonomy of the case academy, in which the
national curriculum and exam preparation dominated the pedagogical practice,
which again was evaluated by means of inspection according to Ofsted criteria.
Conclusion
This article reveals some interesting contrasts in national policy and local practice.
The findings from a case study are not widely generalisable, and the views of the
interviewees may provide a limited and subjective perspective. Nevertheless, our aim
was not to paint a definitive picture, it was rather to point out arising discrepancies
and existing complexities in central–local relations with regard to evaluation. Given
the diminishing importance of legal and financial steering, as well as of local authori-
ties, the soft power of evaluation remains the main element of national direction, and
has a strong effect at the local level. The policymakers considered the school inspec-
tion regime the most important mechanism for ensuring accountability in schools
operating beyond local-authority control. This resonated with the findings from the
case academy: the inspections proved to have a significant influence on the day-to-
day practice of teachers as well as of school management, in line with Dahler-Lar-
sen’s (2012) notion of constitutive effects on the relations of actors. The general
academies-related policy discourse suggests that these schools are liberated from
the National Curriculum, and the opportunities are both recognised and doubted in
the policymakers’ thoughts. However, the case academy rigorously followed the
National Curriculum across subject areas to comply with national standardised
testing.
Both national policymakers and local actors identified a blind spot in the steering,
namely sponsor accountability. The national-level policymakers coined the term
‘middle-tier problem’, whereas at the school level there was a perceived lack of spon-
sor transparency. In the longer term this could be seen as a result of the diminishing
role of local authorities. At the time of writing the discussion on the role of Ofsted in
inspecting academy chains continues. Indeed, the role of Ofsted may become increas-
ingly important, especially as the number of academies continues to increase.
Evaluation policy fits easily into the case academy’s managerial practices. Drawing
on earlier research, we suggest that this could indicate that the state intervention has
been so strong that local-level path dependencies do not apply (Gains et al., 2005), or
that at least in some localities evaluation has become an embedded policy (Ozga &
Jones, 2006). In conclusion, we consider both of these options.
Indeed, the state intervention has been very radical in introducing structural
reforms. One of the biggest changes, the introduction of academies, has closely
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followed the NPM ideal in shifting responsibility away from the public sector, while
retaining evaluative forms of state governance. Nevertheless, the organisation of acad-
emies at the local level, which seems to be in a constant state of reforming and build-
ing new relations, reflects the operational qualities of networked governance. Our
results thus offer some possible new angles compared with earlier research on local-
level path dependency. Evaluation has stark implications on the local-level actor rela-
tions, and as such suggests constitutive effects (Dahler-Larsen, 2012), on the one
hand, and on the other hand highlights the question of whether at the school level the
organisation of local schooling matters in the presence of strong, national evaluation
tools (Gains et al., 2005). This said, our research raises questions concerning conti-
nuity in local-level evaluation dynamics (see Kauko, 2013), regardless of the struc-
tural changes in schooling. Following this line of thinking, future analysis should
concentrate more on action rather than structures.
At least in the case academy and for at least two reasons, it could be argued that
evaluation has become an embedded practice giving less and less room to local actors.
First, given the layers of governance and legislative reforms in the English education
landscape, evaluation seems to be really efficient. Ofsted has strong support among
policymakers, and has long historical legitimation. Testing, again, is the main mea-
sure defining school failure or success. However, it was unexpected how starkly polar-
ised the changes have been in terms of governance levels, and in contrast with the
results of our case study, how national visions of local innovation have been mani-
fested in knee-jerk practices in reaction to inspection and testing. Second, confirming
some earlier research findings (Bamfield, 2012; Exley & Ball, 2011; Goodman &
Burton, 2012), in opposing the promotion of local-level freedom and innovation, the
academy policy has strengthened managerial practices at the school and sponsor lev-
els, and has enhanced national steering tools. As a result, autonomy associated with
academies promotes managerial autonomy among schools and sponsors (Salokangas
2013), and national steering has strengthened its grip. We did not observe local
embedded practices and cultures at the case academy that would challenge the central
steering forces (cf. Tyack & Cuban, 1995). On the contrary, actors at the local level
adapted to the central command and followed the rules and expectations of Ofsted
and standardised testing. However, it is worth noting that we scrutinised one acad-
emy in its local context and there may be deviations from this trend in other localities.
Nevertheless, given that the findings from the case study and the interviews call into
question some of the basic ideas put forward in earlier research on the significance of
the local level, they point to the need for a larger-scale study focusing on what breath-
ing space is left for local actors.
The question, which is uncomfortable politically and difficult to operationalise in
research, concerns whether or not the academy policy has been successful. On the
one hand, the case evidence provides little support on the extent to which the
academies’ legal freedoms have catalysed local innovation in pedagogical practices,
for example. On the other hand, the academy policy has been very successful in
changing the landscape of English schooling. All in all, the academies contribute to
the constitution of a complex and marketised environment of public administration.
The legalistic freedoms give more room for action in principle, and on paper result in
a more fluid form of schooling. We found evidence that, despite their apparent free-
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dom, sponsored academies still closely follow national steering through evaluation.
The long-term impact of the programme is still under construction, but we would not
expect structural reforms catalysing pedagogical revolution as long as the local space
for action is strongly restricted by tools of evaluation.
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